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Theory Z: Myths, Realities 
and Alternatives 
Tomasz Mroczkowski 
An assessment of substance and impact of Theory Z on 
American management in the context of alternative paths toward 
employée participation 
Only recently are many American executives beginning to recognize the 
fact that the country's slipping competitiveness in industrial productivity is 
primarily attributable to deficiencies in management practice. This 
awareness has prompted a very important debate about what to change and 
how in the traditional practices of American management. 
Peter Drucker wrote that management is not a mère discipline, but a 
"culture" with its own values, beliefs, tools and language (Drucker 1972). 
A growing school of thought sees the deficiencies of American management 
as rooted in its subculture, (Pascale, Athos 1981). Comparative studies of 
management in the U.S. and typically coUectivist societies such as Japan 
and China hâve helped pin point some of the culturally determined blind 
spots of American management (Nevis 1982, Pascale, Athos 1981). The 
conclusions from thèse studies reinforce the views previously expressed by 
prominent American sociologists that U.S. culture is in need of an évolution 
in the direction of greater coUectivist or group values. It is argued that if 
American business is to function more effectively, this évolution should 
also take place at the level of the organization, specifically through the 
means of instituting profound changes in human resource management. 
The best publicized expression of this broad recommendation for U.S. 
business is the so-called Theory Z. 
Theory Z contains some gênerai statements about the direction in 
which human resource management Systems and indeed the entire mode of 
social intégration in American organizations should change. Thèse conclu-
sions hâve caused considérable misunderstanding and confusion. In this 
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paper we attempt to separate the kernel of truth in Theory Z from the multi-
ple myths and oversimplications which hâve grown around it. 
An assessment of Theory Z is made hère in the context of alternative 
paths of évolution towards participative management in the U.S. Col-
laboration through paternalism which Theory Z implies is contrasted with 
employée participation through power-sharing based on negotiations and 
broad représentation. 
THEORY Z: THE ARGUMENT 
The theoretical foundation of Theory Z consists of the argument that 
bureaucracy as the principal organizational paradigm employed by 
American business has ceased to be an effective form of regulating social 
transactions. This failure is reflected by increases in employée opportunism, 
low organizational commitment and insufficient motivation to work which 
hâve lead directly to déclines in the rates of growth in productivity and 
foreign competitiveness, characteristic of so many American organizations 
(Ouchi 1980). 
There are, however, some U.S. organizations renowned for their sound 
management and consistent record of économie success which form a 
distinct group: Their human resource management Systems resemble those 
of leading Japanese companies. Thèse are the 'Z ' organizations which are 
contrasted with the 'A' companies which represent the traditional 
(bureaucratie) model prévalent in American business (See Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Japanese and American Organisations Compared 
THE CONTRA ST 
vs. American Organizations 
Short-term Employment 
Rapid Evaluation and Promotion 
Specialized Career Paths 
Explicit Control Mechanism 
Individual Décision Making 
Individual Responsibility 
Segmented Concern 
Source: OUCHI (1981) 
Japanese Organizations 
Lifetime Employment 
Slow Evaluation and Promotion 
Non-Specialized Career Paths 
Implicit Control Mechanisms 
Collective Décision Making 
Collective Responsibility 
Wholistic Concern 
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Theory Z assumes that the différences between the 'A' and the 'Z* 
organizations are the actual causal factors which explain the success of the 
organizations and their long range effectiveness. The set of features 
employed by the 'Z* companies (both in Japan and in the U.S.) amount to a 
distinct "organizational paradigm" (the "clan") which elicits superior 
employée performance, loyalty and commitment by its inclusive relation-
ships. 
According to Theory Z, the very survival of American business 
dépends on its ability to move from the 'A' to the 'Z' paradigm, and on its 
ability to develop clans with the supporting management Systems and 
philosophy that thèse demand. The steps of "going from 'A' to 'Z ' " in-
clude developing a new organizational philosophy, developing interpersonal 
skills, involving the union, stabilizing employment, deciding on a System for 
slow évaluation and promotion, broadening of career paths, enhancing 
employée participation and developing wholistic relations (Ouchi 1981). 
Although thèse steps are formulated in a very gênerai way, their im-
plementation adds up to some very serious commitments for an organiza-
tion. Before making them, executives will want to know the answers to 
many questions: Is the argument about the link between bureaucratie 
failure and productivity décline really valid? Is Theory Z alone sufficient to 
achieve productivity growth? What about the impact of cultural différences 
between U.S. and Japanese society? Are militant unions likely to cooperate 
in implementing Theory Z? What are the intermediate steps or phases 
necessary before a 'Z* System is established? What are the alternatives to 
Theory Z? 
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: THEORY Z AS A RESPONSE 
TO BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE 
Although it calls itself a "theory" the theoretical validity of the " Z " 
concept raises serious doubts. The basic argument is an extension of 
Williamson's framework of market failure resulting from increasing tran-
saction costs (Williamson, 1975). This framework is borrowed and applied 
to bureaucracies: "Bureaucraties can fail when the ambiguity of perfor-
mance évaluation becomes significantly greater than that which brings 
about market failure" (Ouchi 1980). According to this line of reasoning, 
bureaucratie relations are efficient when both performance ambiguity and 
goal incongruence are moderately high. When performance ambiguity is 
high, however, and a réduction of goal incongruence is desired, then, accor-
ding to the model, the clan paradigm becomes désirable. In support of this, 
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examples are quoted of technologically advanced and closely integrated in-
dustries where teamwork is common, technologies change often and in-
dividual performance is highly ambiguous. It is thus technology which 
makes it difficult to measure performance and regulate transactions and 
calls for a change in the organizational paradigm. (Otherwise, employée dé-
viance, opportunism and goal incongruence will keep reducing the effec-
tiveness of the organization.) Theory Z belongs with those théories of the 
évolution of bureaucracy which see technology as a critical factor. 
Research of such authors as Burns and Stalker (Burns and Stalker 
1966) to some extent supports the thesis that innovation, changing 
technology, undermines the effectiveness of classically bureaucratie forms 
and créâtes demands for increased goal congruence and interdependence as 
jobs become less defined. The changing and often transient nature of tasks, 
rôles and therefore of group membership, however, can also act against the 
formation of enduring relationships and lifetime employment in one 
organization, especially when the prevailing values are individualistic en-
trepreneurship and self-fullfilment through mobile career postures. Bennis 
expressed this trend very well in a statement that is a stark contract with the 
whole philosophy of Theory Z: "While skills in human interaction will 
become more important, due to the growing need for collaboration in com-
plex tasks, there will be a concomitant réduction in group cohesiveness. My 
prédiction is that in the organic-adaptive System people will hâve to learn to 
develop quick and intense relationships on the job and learn to bear the loss 
of more enduring work relationships," (Bennis 1966). 
Theory Z does not address itself sufficiently to this tension between the 
need for broad intensive commitment to organizational goals and the need 
for dynamic and flexible employment relations. 
Theory Z attempts to substantiate its broad claim to "bureaucratie 
failure through increasing transaction costs and employée opportunism" by 
quoting the results of a study into the causes of the American décline in out-
put per unit of input between 1965 and 1975. The study showed that: 
1. 78% of the décline was due to increased costs of clean air, clean water, 
and safety on the job. 
2. The remaining 22% is attributable to increased needs for surveillance of 
potentially dishonest employées, customers, contractors, and thieves 
(Ouchi 1980, Denison 1978). 
This décline in net productivity attributed to "a rise in dishonesty and 
crime" actually reflects higher costs of protection that organizations pro-
vide for themselves and which they purchase from specialized firms, as well 
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as costs of theft and damage. The study does not state, however, how much 
of this results from activities by employées and how much by individuals 
and dishonest or déviant people outside the particular organization. The im-
plication contained in the original study is that it is the latter (Denison 
1978). Thus, if anything, this is évidence of an increase in social déviance at 
the societal level rather than the organizational. The argument used in 
Theory Z could hâve been made far stronger if it was shown that déclines in 
productivity growth rates were results of : 
. increasing costs of supervision, enforcement of work discipline. 
. increasing costs of personnel appraisal, conflict and grievance 
resolution resulting from performance ambiguity and employée op-
portunism 
. increased costs of labor turnover, rétention of qualified personnel, 
recruiting, sélection, induction and training. 
Many organizations in this country do indeed face thèse problems. 
Nevertheless, it may be noted that at the aggregate level, there is no évidence 
of an increase in, what might be called, indicators of employée déviance on 
the job. Indeed, absence rates for the U.S. compare favorably with those of 
other countries (Taylor 1978). There is no trend to show increased work 
stoppages. Although in some countries the number of days lost per 1000 
employées is lower than for the U.S., this country is still well ahead of 
Australia, Canada, Italy, and many others. On the other hand, the évidence 
of an increasing trend in "off the job" déviance in U.S. society is moun-
ting: the crime and dishonesty mentioned previously is accompanied by in-
creases in the divorce rate, single parent families, more Americans living 
alone, increased abuse of drugs and alcohol. According to some authors 
thèse factors hâve ail contributed in some way to the national décline in pro-
ductivity growth (Winter 1980). Combating them may require actions at the 
level of society, local community, as well as at the level of the organization. 
It remains very much a question for further study whether introducing 
"clan" type social Systems and thus promoting social intégration at work 
would contribute to solving thèse problems and stimulate productivity. 
Multiple examples of économie failure of diverse clan based organiza-
tions such as utopian communities, production coopératives, collective 
farms show that this type of organizational paradigm only works under very 
spécifie circumstances. It may be hypothesized that it is not technology 
which is the critical precondition for clans but rather the existence of strong 
cultural norms that are mutually shared by clan participants. 
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THEORY Z AND THE JAPANESE PRODUCTIVITY ADVANTAGE: 
MYTH AND REALITY 
A récent 'Fortune' magazine survey indicates that most American and 
Japanese executives believe that Japan is now stronger in overall industrial 
competitiveness than the U.S. and that Japan is continuously gaining an 
even greater edge (Fortune, August 10, 1981). Indeed, relative to Japan, 
U.S. productivity growth has slowed down to such an extent that as so-
meone has calculated, if présent trends continue, Japan will pass the U.S. 
productivity level on May 19, 1992 at 3:45 in the afternoon (Jackson-
Grayson, 1981). While this lag is at last beginning to be appreciated by 
American public opinion, there are widespread misperceptions about what 
lies behind Japanese success. Simplistic explanations vary from pointing at 
the unique Japanese culture, attributing Japanese success to supportive 
government policy and low cost financing to showing the importance of 
friendly unions. When management is correctly seen as one of the principal 
factors behind the expansion of Japanese productivity, it is usually believed 
that it is the human resource management Systems that account for most of 
the Japanese productivity advantage. Theory Z together with a number of 
current publications (Pucik, Hatvany 1980) tends to reinforce this er-
roneous belief. 
If we are to look to Japan for productivity lessons, it should be realized 
that the country's phénoménal development as the leader of the industrializ-
ed world is a resuit of a synergy of many factors: government policy with its 
Systems of planning and administrative guidance together with sound and 
often highly innovative management in both the software and especially the 
hardware areas. The following model categorizes the différent groups of 
factors which account for the Japanese position of économie leadership: 
Macro Micro 
1 2 
Tariffs, Quotas Production Planning 
Tax Laws Organizational Design 
Dépréciation Schedules Inventory Management 
Hardware Government-Planning and Job Design 
Policy Coordination Quality Control Etc. 
R + D Policy 
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Social and Life Time Employment 
Cultural Values Management Values-
Educational Systems Based on Harmony and-
Software Social Structure Consensus 
Business Government- Collective Responsibility 
Relations Implicit Control 
Industrial Relations Wholistic Concern 
(Theory Z) 
Source: Adapted from MCMILLAN (1982) 
Publications like Theory Z hâve focused undue attention on the micro-
software components of management, contributing to the myth that it is in 
this area that primary changes must be made if the U.S. is to "meet the 
Japanese challenge". Even a superficial examination of Japanese perfor-
mance suggests that différent, more complex stratégies are necessary. The 
Japanese lead in hardware management is actually a more important factor 
of that country's productivity advantage: Japan has eight times as many 
robots (séquence machines) as West Germany, the second largest user, and 
fourteen times the number in the U.S. (McMillan, 1982). A récent study 
comparing the productivity of Japanese and U.S. auto plants showed that 
only 39% of the $2000 variance in savings could be explained by human 
resource management Systems while the remaining 61% resulted from 
typical hardware components such as process automation, product design, 
quality control etc. (McMillan 1982). 
Thus it is the first three spaces of our 'matrix' which deserve far more 
attention. Japanese innovations in production management such as their 
unique system of préventive quality management, élimination of buffer 
stocks and the tight coupling of the line of the KANBAN system also hâve 
to be appreciated. Especially so because their adoption under some cir-
cumstances does not encounter the cultural and societal barriers that 
changes in human resource Systems may do. 
Adapting Japanese solutions at the macro level must obviously be a 
very sélective process and is not the subject of this paper. But even a super-
ficial examination of the instruments and methods of policy coordination 
among industries and government in Japan suggests some of the directions 
of change for the U.S. towards stimulating investment and industrial in-
novation, research and development through government action. 
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JAPANESE CLANS AND AMERICAN CLANS 
But it would also be a mistake to underestimate the rôle of the human 
resource management Systems in the Japanese industrial structure. There 
are important lessons for the U.S. to be learned hère too. Observation of 
Japanese management can be used to gain instructive insights into the 
culturally conditioned weak spots of American management. Beyond that 
the difficulty lies in developing new forms of management that would be at-
tuned to American culture and traditions. This is an especially difficult task 
in the case of human resources management which leads many executives to 
doubt whether anything at ail can be adapted from Japan. 
In its attempt to find common features of U.S. and Japanese organiza-
tion, Theory Z tends to underestimate the importance of crucial différences 
which effect organizational functioning. 
Ail organizational paradigms co-exist within and are supported by 
social and cultural environments. While the idea of a clan is a theoretical 
construct, real clan type Systems will be varied as will be their effectiveness. 
In order to evaluate the transferability hypothesis and the prédiction of 
parallel effectiveness, a conceptual understanding of the différences bet-
ween American and Japanese clans is needed. Superficially the most strik-
ing différences might appear as in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 
The U.S. and Japan Compared 
U.S. JAPAN 
resource abundance and population scarcity resource scarcity and population density 
together with lack of feudal tradition explain stimuiate social intégration based on clan 
American individualistic entrepreneurship forms-influence of feudal System strong 
and the market as the dominant form of 
social transactions-clan forms exceptional as 
basis for économie activity 
The Japanese mode of social intégration evolved as a resuit of the 
geographical, démographie and économie necessities of an island nation 
deprived of resources (including farmland) but with a large population den-
sity. The various institutions and social behaviors hâve sprung up in Japan 
to counterbalance the extrême costs of this fundamental économie 
weakness. Conditions in the U.S. hâve been an almost perfect contrast. 
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There is no environment that would promote 'clan' based forms of social 
intégration in the U.S. American cultural norms hâve also evolved in a com-
pletely différent direction. 
Even such a superficial comparison demonstrates profound différences 
between the genesis, functions, and environments in which clans operate in 
the two countries. Using Hofstede's detailed measurements of cultural 
distance between the U.S., Europe, and Japan, and Etzioni's concepts of 
organizational involvement (Hofstede, 1980; Etzioni, 1975), more detailed 
comparisons can be made and the managerial conséquences of the dif-
férences assessed. The Table 3 represents the principal results of such an 
analysis: 
TABLE 3 
The Impact of Cultural Différences Upon Organizational Behavior 
(U.S., Europe and Japan Compared) 
Cultural Major différences between U.S. and 
Dimension Japan 
Power Power distance index for Japan 
Distance greater than for U.S. (53 points as 
opposed to 39 on a scale of 11 to 94). 
U.S. close to major European na-
tions on power index scale. 
Uncertainty Uncertainty avoidance much higher 
Avoidance in Japan than in either the U.S. or 
European countries (Japan score 93 
as opposed to 43 for U.S. or 35 for 
Great Britain). 
Individualism The U.S. is one of the most in-
Collectivism dividualist cultures (score 45) while 
Japan is a typically collectivist one 
(score 91). Most European nations 
are more collectivist, but closer to 
U.S. than to Japan on this dimen-
Consequences of différences in 
terms of organizational attitudes 
and behavior 
Like Europeans, U.S. employées are 
less likely to accept dependence on 
organization, and hierarchical dif-
férences than Japanese employées 
who will tend to regard power as a 
basic fact of society. 
American and European employées 
will tend to hâve a much weaker 
need for consensus and a higher 
tolérance of déviant behavior than 
the Japanese. Americans will value 
security less highly, will tend to take 
risks more readily, engaging in con-
flict and compétition (something the 
Japanese will avoid). 
For the Japanese, loyalty to the 
organization as a clan is a fun-
damental culturally enforced norm, 
on which their personal identity 
dépends. Hence, involvement is in-
tensive and moral. This is not so in 
the case of American employées. 
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Hofstede's measurements highlight the great cultural 'distance' bet-
ween Japan and the U.S., which is culturally much doser to Europe. Thèse 
cultural différences hâve a direct and profound impact on the whole net-
work of relationships within organizations. While outlining the basic steps 
for implementation, Theory Z does not elaborate on the conséquences of in-
troducing clan System in terms of supervisory practices and subordinate ex-
pectations and attitudes. The changeover from an 'A' type System to a 'Z ' 
organization would entail profound changes in supervisor-subordinate rela-
tionships and attitudes. In a model sensé, thèse might look as in Table 4. 
Moving from an 'A' type of organization to a 'Z ' type organization (to 
borrow Ouchi's terms) would mean not only changes in the basic staffing 
practices, but also profound changes in supervisory practices and subor-
dinate expectancies. It is easier to introduce new company policies on staff-
ing than to influence the subtle motivational relationships between 
superiors and subordinates which are strongly culture bound. As has been 
pointed out, the Japanese clan type culture is essentially différent from 
mainstream American culture. Thus, implementing clan Systems within an 
American culturally 'hostile' environment would pose the following pro-
blems: 
Because of the strong cultural différence, the intensity of involvement 
of American employées in their organizations would be considerably less 
and more temporary in nature than in the Japanese case. The primary dif-
férence is that long-range maintenance of involvement is culturally reinforc-
ed in the Japanese case through outside group pressure and normative sanc-
tioning of déviance and tolérance for coersion. Thèse forces would be not 
only weaker in the American case, but counteracting forces would be pré-
sent. 
As Etzioni puts it, social groups define not only the intensity of their 
norms, but also their substance. Thus, the direction of the involvement may 
be différent. For instance, American employées may be more inclined to be 
highly committed to organizational goals but not to its management (in con-
strast to Japanese paternalism). Strong organizational commitment may be 
induced in an American organization under spécial circumstances (a crisis), 
but will tend to fade as circumstances change. 
Thus, the challenge facing Theory Z companies is to create a new type 
of clan System which would be considerably "looser" than its Japanese 
counterpart. Thèse organizations may be seen as agents of profound 
cultural change towards more collectivist values in American society. It is 
true that some formulations of Theory Z acknowledge this. 
Supervisory-Subordinate 
TABLE 4 
Relationships in 'A' and 'Z' Organizations 
The 'A ' Organization The 'Z' Organisation The 'Z' Organization 
Differing ranges of 
supervisory behavior 
Reliance on material rewards. 
Immédiate positive reinforce-
ment stressing individual achieve-
ment and immédiate resuit s. 
Use of compétitive pressure and 
conflit to elicit performance. 
Threat of firing. 
Remunerative sanctioning ap-
plied through formai channels at 
greater rank distance. 
Differing subordinate 
expectancies 
Convictions - Individual achieve-
ment will bring quick promotion 
and reward. 
Must perform to keep job. 
- Good to be better than others. 
- Good to become specialized. 
- Will perform as long as rewards 
justify rank distance. 
Differing ranges of 
supervisory behavior 
Restricted use of material 
rewards and threat of firing. 
Increased use of appeal to com-
mon good, exploitation of group 
pressure. 
Use of team rewards rather than 
individual rewards. 
Reliance on intensive moral in-
volvement of employées. 
Normative sanctioning requires 
intensive Personal relations and 
limited rank distance. 
Differing subordinate 
expectancies 
- Convictions - Promotion and 
rewards corne as resuit of loyalty 
and seniority. 
- It is difficult to be fired, commit-
ment to organization means 
security. 
- Being a good team player is bet-
ter than being outstanding. 
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THEORY Z AND THE ADVERSARY LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
Theory Z implies a vision of an organization full of harmony, coopéra-
tion, and commitment. As such, it borders on an "organizational utopia". 
For cultural reasons previously cited, such a utopia is impractical to 
achieve, especially in the U.S. Theory Z in one of its thirteen steps of im-
plementation includes "involving the union". A close collaborative union-
management relationship is clearly assumed. The adversary nature of labor-
management relations in the U.S. is a well-known fact, and the implementa-
tion of Theory Z would presumably mean changing or at least modifying 
this relationship. For reasons outlined below, this would be an extraor-
dinarily difficult task. 
U.S. workers hâve traditionally exercised their power to change and 
modify the work relationship through the System of unregulated volun-
taristic collective bargaining. As has been said, labor-management relations 
hâve been adversary. Most unionists think of themselves as the protectors 
of employées, as the intervening variable between workers and manage-
ment, serving as a safeguard against exploitive management action. After 
"économie gain", the reason given most frequently by new union members 
for joining is "protection against arbitrary management action". This is 
évidence of popular perception of the degree to which unions fulfill this 
protective rôle (Seidman, London, Karsh 1979). Union leaders hâve con-
sistently opposed ideas of involving unions in close coopération with 
management. Albert Zach, AFL-CIO Director of Public Relations, has said 
that is is préférable for U.S. unions to meet company représentatives across 
the bargaining table rather than try to get involved in management func-
tions. (Kovach, Sands, Brooks, 1980) 
It is interesting to note that the Japanese themselves hâve been quick to 
recognize this problem. When locations were chosen for Japanese sub-
sidiaries in the U.S. and Britain, new zones were picked away from areas 
with traditions of labor conflict and militancy (Rattner 1982). In spite of the 
widely publieized efforts by the Japanese to adapt their management to 
American culture and please American employées, some of thèse plants 
(e.g., Sanyo's San Diego plant and the Honda plant in Ohio) are experienc-
ing labor problems leading to unionization. (Chung, Gray 1982) 
In contrast with Japan and Europe, the traditional attitudes of the 
three most important parties in the U.S., business, government, and labor, 
towards enhanced collaboration and participation in management hâve 
been cool (Soutar 1973). What we hâve in the U.S. is a non-collaborative 
culture. As Nancy Foy and Herman Gadon put it, "Collaboration by law is 
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impossible until the culture becomes collaborative". While it promotes 
peace by enforcing the rights of employées to organize and bargain through 
unions, U.S. law also reinforces the adversary nature of the union-
management relationship and puts the emphasis on trading rather than 
coopération. The rapid spread of unionism to public employées today fur-
thers this adversary stance. Forbidden the right to strike, they turn to ar-
bitration and neutral fact-finders (as in Britain). This practice brings only 
uneasy truce and little development of the institutions and traditions needed 
to build trust (Foy and Gadon 1976). 
As has been said, the need to change the non-collaborative culture of 
U.S. organizations is increasingly recognized. This is clearly a precondition 
to introducing developed formai schemes of participative management of 
which Theory Z is but one. The great diversity and complexity of American 
society défies any generalized prescription of how to proceed from a non-
collaborative to a collaborative management culture. For such progress to 
be successful and permanent, change should follow a pattern of graduai 
évolution. It is possible to discern several possible patterns of this change 
process. It is argued hère that Theory Z, to be successfully implemented, 
would hâve to be preceded by more limited schemes of participative 
management. More importantly, however, Theory Z is by no means the on-
ly model for American management for the 1980's. 
CHANGING MANAGEMENT CULTURE FROM ABOVE: 
COLLABORATION THROUGH PATERNALISM 
The need for promoting closer coopération in U.S. organizations is 
sufficiently great that increasingly it is management itself which is initiating 
changes leading towards greater employée participation in décision making. 
American management scholars hâve advocated more participative 
management for some time (McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y, W. Ben-
nis and E. Schein, Chris Argyris and others). In contrast with Japanese and 
European concepts, traditionally, the American "school" has tended to 
emphasize individuals rather than groups. More recently, the emphasis both 
at the level of practice and also, to some extent, theory has shifted towards 
the small group. Management authors hâve been advocating a trend 
towards an increased focus on the use of small groups — a recourse that 
American managers are only beginning to tap (Nevis 1982). The rapid 
growth and success of quality circles illustrâtes the great potential that small 
groups hâve for improving productivity, product quality, job satisfaction, 
and morale. There is some évidence that those organizations which hâve im-
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plemented quality circles most successfully are also the ones which hâve 
made a very définitive commitment to changing management culture. For 
such an approach to work, the dynamics of the change process must be 
maintained. The alternative is a pattern of zig-zag innovation based on a 
succession of fads that are abandoned as soon as the novelty of the idea 
wears off — a tendency that has been criticized time and again by manage-
ment writers (Patchin 1981, Pascale and Athos 1981). 
If the effectiveness of management initiatives aimed at improving col-
laboration and enhancing participation is to be maintained, it must foliow a 
course of what Pascale and Athos hâve called "organic growth,\ Parts of 
such a pattern are discernible now, and it is also possible to forecast possible 
future évolutions and attempt to place Theory Z within it. 
FIGURE 1 
Growth of Paternalistic Participative Management: from Focus on the 
Individuel to the Small Group to the Entire Organization. 
Focus of Participation 
The Entire 
The Individual The Group Organization 
Autonomous Theory Z 
Work Teams * (The Clan) 
Profit Co-ownership 
Sharing 
Theory Z might be perceived as a possible "final outcome" in a process 
of growth from schemes of participative management, which are designed 
to activate the individual, through schemes which rely on small group 
solidarity, to the concept of all-embracing clan solidarity at the level of the 
entire organization — ail changes being initiated and controlled by manage-
ment. The économie dimension of increased participation might be seen as 
the introduction of cost-savings sharing plans, profit sharing (as in Japan), 
and even forms of co-ownership (as practiced in Scandinavia). 
While the successful use of quality circles and, in some cases, 
autonomous work teams with cost-savings sharing plans and profit sharing 
are viable évolutions of American management, for sociological and 
cultural reasons, close intégration at the level of the entire organization in 
Theory Y Quality 
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the form envisioned by Theory Z would be difficult in the U.S. environ-
ment. The transition from focus on the individual to the small group is 
easier than from the small group to the entire organization. The latter 
would require very careful préparation: the sélection and socialization of 
people who could function effectively under Theory Z, major investment in 
employée training on a continuous basis, major commitments in terms of 
revising personnel policies; and then maybe in ten years a Theory Z Com-
pany could be built. Such a major commitment to change is unlikely to be 
made by companies struggling to survive. For them, more limited forms of 
participative management, such as quality circles, are more advisable. In a 
number of working environments, however, it may prove simply imprac-
tical or even impossible to 'educate' and 'socialize' employées to the pater-
nalist Theory Z culture. In such cases, alternative modes of participative 
management must be pursued. 
THE NON-PATERNALIST ALTERNATIVE 
A récent survey of workers* participation in décisions within undertak-
ings in a number of countries found that in spite of the great diversity of 
schemes, most of the viable Systems explicitly or implicitly used collective 
bargaining: "The fundamental importance of collective bargaining in many 
countries has been highlighted in this study, and it has been shown that in 
practice, negotiations are also conducted on works councils whenever it is a 
matter of co-decision, or even of extensive consultation on problems which 
are important for the workers. Even compromises reached between 
shareholders' représentatives and workers' représentatives on boards of 
directors (or supervisory boards) where such dual représentation exists are 
often, in fact, the outcome of bargaining. Thus, job security safeguards 
may be adopted in some countries in the course of negotiation of a collec-
tive agreement in the undertaking, while in other countries, they may be 
agreed upon at a meeting of the supervisory board, though even in that 
case, the décision is likely to hâve been preceded by active negotiation." 
(Workers Participation in Décisions Within Undertakings, ILO, Geneva, 
1981.) 
The use of negotiations and bargaining is also practiced in Japan 
(Vogel, 1975) with ail its emphasis on harmony and consensus. Theory Z, as 
formulated by Ouchi, omits this very important dimension, a dimension 
which has to be taken into account in any comprehensive model of manage-
ment which is being advocated for the U.S. 
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Where the expectations of power sharing and rôle influence are 
widespread among the labor force, the alternative to paternalistic Theory Z 
may be forms of participation based on the European idea of co-
determination. 
It is important not to confuse the Japanese type of 'participation' with 
European co-determination. As an authority on Japanese management puts 
it, "In spite of the stability of the labor force, Japanese managers are still 
reluctant to introduce participation as increasingly practiced in Europe" 
(Sasaki 1982). European co-determination in its various forms essentially 
entails power sharing through employées' représentatives on boards of 
directors. As such, the System clashes with managerial paternalism. 
A controversy exists as to the applicability of thèse types of Systems for 
the U.S. The case against adopting European Systems is often based on such 
arguments as U.S. workers' préférences being focused on pay and benefits 
as opposed to job enrichment and participation. Experiments in which U.S. 
auto workers were taken to Sweden and placed in self-managing work 
groups are cited as proof of the inapplicability of European Systems (five 
out of six Americans did not like the Swedish style) (Foy, Gadon 1976). 
This focus on traditional blue-collar attitudes and needs obscures the 
fact that the pattern is changing and important segments of the labor force 
think quite differently. Management is changing its traditionally hostile at-
titude towards participation, too. 
A survey of businessmen's attitudes towards corporate democracy con-
ducted by the Harvard Business Review revealed a clear trend towards less 
autocratie practices and a growing support on the part of executives to 
enlarge the influence of employées (Ewing 1971). About a third of the 
respondents were willing to let employées vote on selected policy issues con-
fronting top management. When a new chief executive is being selected, 
most businessmen felt that the board of directors should normally take the 
feelings of key employée groups into account. Only a small minority felt 
that a corporation's duty is only to its owners. More than 60% believed that 
the interests of owners must be served in compétition with the interests of 
employées, customers and the public. Leading sources of support for this 
idea were found in management consulting, government, éducation and 
social services, small companies, and the far west and south central areas of 
the country. Thèse sectors were the ones which absorbed the new génération 
of workers and are probably the ones where the ratio of white-collar 
workers is the highest. At the same time, the manufacturing industries 
located in the east and midwest were represented by significantly more con-
servative views (Ewing 1971). 
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Longitudinal studies of worker attitudes in the U.S. show some 
évidence of a trend towards a greater interest in intrinsic rewards including 
more responsibility, while interest in purely économie rewards does not ap-
pear to be growing (Casey 1979). 
A récent survey of a nationally représentative cross-section of U.S. 
workers concluded that "it is norm among American workers to désire par-
ticipation in workplace décision making. Actual participation is not univer-
sal in workplace décisions, however, and is typically marginal in décisions 
regarding the organization of one's work. A majority of workers (both 
union and non-union) désire direct participation. Union members also 
désire indirect participation through their union. Both participation in task 
and participation in organization of work décisions independently con-
tribute to worker well-being. Participation is observed to help ameliorate 
the négative effects of job demands upon workers" (Goitein, Seashore 
1980). 
The white-collar and professional employées may constitute an even 
more acute problem. Research shows that the surprising levels of job 
dissatisfaction among some groups of white-collar employées are linked to 
lack of rôle influence (Ritti 1970). Thèse groups, often highly unionized, 
may well form the first constituency for co-determination in the U.S. 
The differing attitudes of workers towards co-determination in the 
private and public sectors are reflected by the positions adopted by their 
unions. Hardly any major private sector union has endorsed the idea, while 
such important unions as the Teamsters hâve clearly stated that they regard 
the idea as moot. On the other hand, Richard Calistri of the American 
Fédération of Government Employées has said that his organization would 
be delighted to hâve co-determination. The prospect of sitting on a cor-
porate board of directors for public sector employées holds the promise of 
affecting an increasing number of issues (Kovach 1980). 
The basic changes in the attitudes of executives and workers do not 
mean, however, that the European path towards co-determination can and 
will be foliowed exactly by America. Industrial democracy in Europe was 
largely legislated through the actions of government and parliamentary 
bodies. Employers' attitudes changed towards acceptance of the System 
after it had been institutionalized (Sacker 1981). 
The growing need for participative management in American may 
corne about differently from Europe. It is also likely to follow a différent 
course in organizations employing predominately white-collar as opposed 
to blue-collar workers. The growth of unions has occurred in many white-
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collar dominated organizations and has coincided with the rapid spread of 
unionism to public employées (Foy and Gadon 1976). Under thèse cir-
cumstances, it is likely that the U.S. white-collar workers will seek to extend 
their influence to modify more and more aspects of the work relationship 
through the traditional American System of voluntaristic collective bargain-
ing and arbitration. The American government is not inclined to enforce co-
determination through législative action as European governments hâve 
done, and so the generally acknowledged need for participative manage-
ment is likely to be implemented hère differently from Europe. 
Where employées hâve strong expectations of rôle influence and par-
ticipation in décision making at the policy level (which is the case for impor-
tant groups of white-collar and professional employées, especially working 
in the public sector), it is possible to envision an alternative path of évolu-
tion of participation culminating in co-determination by employée représen-
tatives at the board level: 
FIGURE 2 
The Non-Paternalist Path Towards Participation 
Cost Savings > Profit — > Co-Ownership 
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The Figure 2 represents a possible or likely path of évolution towards 
co-determination in the U.S. It is assumed that the labor-management rela-
tionship would be based on bargaining and negotiation instead of automatic 
consensus, and employée demands would concentrate on participation in 
savings, profits on the one hand, and quality of work life, self-
management, and représentation on the board on the other. 
The alternative of worker-co-determination has been neglected in the 
current préoccupation with Japan. Although at the présent time only a 
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minority of employées and organizations may be fully prepared for it, in the 
long run, participative worker democracy présents an alternative to the 
paternalistic, management-dominated mode of participation. Co-
determination embodies some of the preciously nourished, cultural tradi-
tions shared by Western Europe and America, such as the value of in-
dividual self-fulfillment, tolérance for déviance, equal distribution and con-
trol of power, and quality of work life. 
Is Theory Z irreconcilable with co-determination and collective 
bargaining? Although the two represent distinct Systems, a synthesis of the 
best features of Theory Z with its collectivist solidarity and strong member 
commitment with the power sharing of co-determination may be practically 
possible. This synthesis may constitute the difficult idéal which organiza-
tions strive to achieve. 
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La théorie Z; mythes, réalités et alternatives 
Le modèle traditionnel américain de relations professionnelles antagonistes 
fondé sur un système de valeurs sociales qui s'appuie sur l'indépendance plutôt que 
l'interdépendance a subi peu de changement durant la période d'expansion économi-
que et de plein emploi relatif consécutive à la guerre. Cette période est révolue et 
nombre de facteurs sont à l'oeuvre qui peuvent modifier les relations de travail dans 
l'avenir. 
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On reconnaît que la mise en place d'un système de rapports collectifs de travail 
basé sur la collaboration est une nécessité économique autant que sociale. Des études 
récentes laissent deviner d'importants changements de point de vue tant du côté des 
employeurs que des travailleurs. Nombre d'indices révèlent que les employeurs 
américains commencent à accepter l'idée que les salariés doivent participer davanta-
ge aux prises de décision, même si cette tendance est discontinuée et qu'elle varie 
selon les régions et les secteurs d'activité économique. De même, des études remon-
tant assez loin dans le passé laissent voir chez les travailleurs américains plus d'intérêt 
pour ce qui leur apporte satisfaction personnelle, en particulier l'acceptation des 
responsabilités. La volonté des travailleurs de «jouer leur rôle» tant au sein des syn-
dicats qu'ailleurs est forte. Cependant, le degré réel de participation à l'intérieur de 
ces organismes reste loin de leurs attentes. 
Si certains nient encore les avantages de rapports collectifs de travail qui repo-
sent sur la coopération, il n'y a guère d'entente sur le modèle américain le meilleur 
d'assurer une direction participative au cours de la décennie 1980. En l'absence de 
législation, voire de simple orientation, les programmes volontaires manquent de 
profondeur et ont tendance à être abandonnés et remplacés par de nouveaux 
«dadas» au fur et à mesure que les circonstances changent. Faute d'une approche qui 
favoriserait l'évolution des relations professionnelles aux États-Unis, on se rabat sur 
les systèmes qui existent sur d'autres continents, notamment au Japon et en Europe 
de l'ouest. 
La théorie Z a beaucoup attiré l'attention comme modèle abstrait de coopéra-
tion entre employeurs et salariés à base de paternalisme, laquelle serait susceptible 
d'aider les entreprises américaines «à faire face au défi japonais» en y implantant 
certains éléments empruntés au régime de travail mis en place au Japon. Les fonde-
ments abstraits de la théorie Z comme moyens de combattre l'échec bureaucratique 
sont chancelants en ce sens que les différences de culture entre les États-Unis et le 
Japon rendraient lente et difficile l'adoption stricte d'un système s'appuyant sur les 
clans. 
Les régimes de relations professionnelles du Japon, non plus que ceux de 
l'Europe, ne paraissent pas être des régimes immédiatement adaptables aux États-
Unis. En effet, la grande diversité et la complexité de la société américaine s'oppo-
sent à toute implantation généralisée d'un régime de relations de travail basé sur la 
coopération alors que le régime américain repose sur l'antagonisme. Pour que cela 
puisse réussir et devenir permanent, le changement doit se faire graduellement. Et 
l'on peut discerner plusieurs modèles possibles de ce processus de changement. 
La théorie Z, si l'on veut qu'elle s'implante avec quelque chance de succès, doit 
être précédée de différents plans de gestion multiple. Et chose encore plus impor-
tante, cette théorie n'est en aucune façon l'unique modèle de gestion pour la décen-
nie 1980. 
À trop se préoccuper de ce qui se fait au Japon, on a négligé les autres régimes de 
coopération entre employeurs et salariés. Bien que, à l'heure actuelle, une minorité 
de travailleurs et d'entreprises puissent y être bien préparés, en longue période, les 
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régimes, qui s'appuient sur la démocratie industrielle, sont une alternative valable 
aux modes de participation paternaliste dominés par les employeurs. La co-
détermination incarne quelques-unes des traditions culturelles les plus enracinées qui 
sont partagées par l'Europe occidentale et les États-Unis. Telles que les valeurs 
d'épanouissement personnel, de tolérance, de déviance, de partage et de contrôle du 
pouvoir ainsi que de la qualité de la vie au travail. 
De plus, la question demeure de savoir si, en longue période, les avantages de la 
gestion multiple peuvent se maintenir à l'intérieur d'un régime purement paternaliste 
qui semble avoir la préférence des entreprises américaines. La logique d'une authen-
tique association entre patrons et ouvriers exige davantage de partage du pouvoir 
fondé sur des négociations. 
La théorie Z est-elle irréconciliable avec la gestion polyvalente et la négociation? 
Bien que l'une et l'autre fasse partie des systèmes différents, une synthèse des meil-
leurs attributs de la théorie Z et la recherche de la co-détermination peut être possi-
ble. Cette synthèse peut être l'idéal difficile que les entreprises s'essaient à réaliser. 
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